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Abstract
Digital Signatures are primarily employed to achieve data integrity, data origin authentication and non-repudiation. In comparison
to RSA-based digital signatures, the ECC (Elliptical Curve Cryptography) based Signature schemes like ECDSA (Elliptical Curve
Digital Signature Algorithm) are more efﬁcient and suited for a resource-constrained network like WSN. In a WSN, proper entity
authentication is to be achieved before the sensor data is exchanged. The use of ECDSA is not suitable for achieving mutual
authentication between the entities like the base station, cluster heads and nodes. Based on the study of ECDSA, the paper designs
a mutual authentication protocol with the help of a computationally low signature scheme. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
ﬁrst digital signature based scheme which achieves mutual entity authentication. The paper also brings out performance parameters
of the developed protocol.
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1. Introduction
Authentication is an assurance about the identities of communicating nodes or principals in any network. It involves
a process to ascertain that the data has come from the alleged source and has not been modiﬁed en route. An adversary
may spoof the source address and then inject malicious packets into the network so as to camouﬂage its originality1.
As WSN primarily involve sensor data, based on which certain alarms and actuators are activated, authentication
becomes imperative. Mutual entity authentication plays an important role in securing WSN against many types of
attacks like impersonation, falsiﬁcation of data, replay attacks etc. leading to DoS. Not many computationally efﬁcient
schemes have been developed to achieve this security primitive suitable for WSN.
DSA is a widely acknowledged mechanism for accomplishing authentication. It was initially proposed by the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in August 1991 and was notiﬁed in Federal Information
Processing Standard of U.S Government called the Digital Signature Standard (DSS). Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA) which is based on DSA, provides a proﬁcient message authentication scheme for WSN2. In this
paper based on the study and research of the ECDSA, a mutual authentication scheme comprising of 4 phases has been
proposed.
∗Corresponding author. Tel.: 0194-2300502; Fax: 0194-2300949.
E-mail address: moonah@rediffmail.com
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of organizing committee of the Organizing Committee of IMCIP-2016
188   Ayaz Hassan Moon et al. /  Procedia Computer Science  89 ( 2016 )  187 – 192 
Table 1. Signature Generation.
Input: parameter group D = (q, FR, S, a, b, P, n, h), private key d, message m.
Step Operation
1 Selecting k
2 Calculation: Calculate k P = (x1, y1)
3 Calculation: Calculate r = x¯1 mod n. If r = 0, then to 1).
4 Calculation: Calculate e = H (m).
5 Calculation: Calculate s = k−1(e + dr) mod n. If s = 0, then to 1).
6 Return: Return (r, s).
Output: signature (r, s).
Table 2. Signature Veriﬁcation.
Input: parameter group D = (q, FR, S, a, b, P, n, h), private key Q, message m, signature (r, s).
Step Operation
1 Check out weather r and s are between 1 and n − 1. If anyone is not, the verify result is false.
2 Calculate e = H (m).
3 Calculate w = s−1 mod n
4 Calculate u1 = ew mod n
5 Calculate X = u1 p + u2Q
6 If X = ∞, then refuse this signature else Take the x-axis coordinates x1 of X to integer X1, calculate v = x1 mod n
Output: Return: If v = r , return acceptance of this signature, else return not accept
1.1 Elliptical Curve Discrete Log Problem
ECC based cryptosystem was proposed by Miller3 and Koblitz4. An elliptic curve comprises of a set of numbers
(x, y), regarded as points on that curve. The curve has to satisfy the following equation:
y2 = x3 + ax + b (1)
Elliptic curve cryptography offers a higher level of security in comparison to more traditional public crypto scheme
like RSA. The hardness of the curve is assumed because of its elliptic curve discrete logarithmic problem ECDLP5
nature, for which the best known algorithm is exponential6. This enables ECC to work with smaller key size to achieve
the same level of security as RSA does with comparatively larger key size. It has been reported than 160 Bit ECC
can provide comparable security to 1024 Bit RSA7. Use of smaller key size results in achieving faster computation
efﬁciency, saving of bandwidth, memory and energy. These features in ECC make it a front-end choice for WSN
security.
1.2 Elliptical curve digital signature algorithm
The elliptic curve digital signature algorithm is the elliptic curve analogue of DSA and serves the same purposes of
key generation, signature generation, and signature veriﬁcation5,6. As given in Wang8, ECDSA comprises of 2 parts
• Signature Generation
• Signature Veriﬁcation
The Elliptic Curve parameters can be described as: T = (FR, E, P, n, h), where FR is the ﬁeld representation, E is
an elliptic curve, P is the generator point, n is the order of P a large prime number and h is cofactor. The system uses
a hash function H . The user chooses a private key d , and calculates its corresponding public key as Pd = P∗d . The
signature generation and veriﬁcation is shown in Table 1 and Table 2.
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Table 3. Notations used.
Symbol Notation
h() One way-hash function
p A prime number
Fp A ﬁnite ﬁeld
E Elliptic curve
G Generator point of order n
I Di Node identity of i th node
I D j Node identity of j th node
BS Base station
Sb Random Number Chosen by BS, to act as private key
Pb Public Key of BS, Pk = Sb.G
ri Private key Chosen by i th Node
Pi Public Key of i th Node
r j Private key Chosen by j th Node
Pj Public Key of j th Node
si Signature of i th node
s j Signature of j th node
R1 Random number chosen by i th node
R2 Random number chosen by j th node
2. Proposed Node Authentication Protocol
The protocol design comprises of following phases: Initialization phase, Signature generation phase, Signature
veriﬁcation phase, Mutual authentication phase. The notations used in this paper are given in Table 3.
2.1 Initialization phase
Base station functions like a key generation and distribution center and sets up the system parameters as following:
The parameter group of system is D = (Fp, E,G, n, h, H, Sb, Ps ).
2.2 Signature generation phase
It is a pre-deployment phase in which base Station selects a random number sb between 1 to n − 1 as its private
key and computes its public key Pb = G.sb. For each node i , the base station generates a random number r such that
1 < r < n − 1. It computes public key for each node Pi = G.ri . Base station computes a signature for each node
using signature function si (ri , Id, sb).
Signature of each node
si = r−1i [ri .h(Id) + sb] (2)
Each node is preloaded with its speciﬁc signature si. , public certiﬁcate of base station sb and public certiﬁcate of each
node Pi is made public to the network.
2.3 Signature veriﬁcation phase
This is a selfcheck by the node to ensure that the signature si pertains to it and has been correctly generated and
thereafter loaded into it. The node uses its node identiﬁcation, public certiﬁcate, and the public certiﬁcate of the base
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Table 4. Mutual authentication phase.
Step Node i Node j
1. Select a random number R1 Compute GR1 Select a random number R2 Compute and send G.R2 to Node i
2. Compute:
si (GR1 + ri G), siG,GR2
Send it to node j
3. Verify:
si (GR1 + riG) = (si .G).R1 + si (ri .G)
If LHS=RHS then node j authenticates node i
4. Compute:
s j (GR2 + r j G), s j G
Send it to node i
5. Verify:
s j (GR2 + r j G) = (s j .G).R2 + s j (r j .G)
If LHS=RHS then node i authenticates node j
station to verify the authenticity of its signature.
si = r−1i [ri .h(Id) + sb] (3)
ri = s−1i [ri .h(Id) + sb] : Multiplying each side by G
G.ri = G.s−1i [ri .h(Id) + sb] = s−1i .Gri .h(Id) + s−1i .G.sb (4)
G.ri = s−1i .h(Id).public certiﬁcate of node i + s−1i .public certiﬁcate of base station
Node i veriﬁes its signature value si as given at (1) by computing the RHS value of equation (2) and comparing it with
LHS. If the equation (2) is satisﬁed then the signature si of node i is veriﬁed. Signature veriﬁcation is undertaken by
the other nodes in a similar manner.
2.4 Mutual authentication
Let node i and node j have to authenticate each other. Their mutual authentication can be achieved by using their
respective signatures, their public certiﬁcates and the public certiﬁcate of the base station. Let their signatures be Si
and Sj as following:
si = r−1i [rih(Id) + sb] (5)
s j = r−1j [r j h(Id) + sb] (6)
The mutual authentication process ﬂow between Node i and Node j are shown in Table 4.
3. Time and Energy Analysis
Initialization and signature generation phases are done at pre-deployment, thus, their contribution to energy
consumption at post-deployment is not considered. For capturing computational time of different key operations like
Point Addition, Scalar Multiplication, Inverse a fundamental setup was created using MicaZ9 mote and a MIB5209
Gateway. A nesC program has been written on TinyOS10,11 platform to compute on the time of various operation on
MicaZ mote.The program has been enabled with TinyECC12 library. The computational time recorded for different
operations is shown in Table 5. Computational time has been recorded over 3 standard SECG curves: Secp 192r1,
Secp 160r1, Secp 128r1 to analyze the effect of key size on energy consumption.
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Table 5. Computational Time Recorded.
Time Taken (Seconds)
Operation Secp192r1 Secp160r1 Secp128r1
Scalar Multiplication 6.07 3.90 2.23
Point Addition 0.21 0.14 0.098
Inverse Operation 0.16 0.12 0.069
Table 6. Critical Operation in 4 phases of Mutual Entity Authentication Protocol.
Inverse
S. No. Phase Scalar Multiplication Point Addition Multiplication
1 Initialization – – –
2 Signature Generation – – –
3 Signature Veriﬁcation 2 1 1
4 Mutual Authentication 4 2 –
Table 7. Energy and Time Analysis of Mutual Entity Authentication Protocol.
Secp192r1 Secp160r1 Secp128r1
Time Energy Time Energy Time Energy
S. No. Phase Taken (Secs) Consumed (mJ) Taken (Secs) Consumed (mJ) Taken (Secs) Consumed (mJ)
1 Initialization – – – – – –
2 Signature Generation – – – – – –
3 Signature Veriﬁcation 12.51 739.34 8.06 476.34 4.62 273.04
4 Mutual Authentication 24.78 1464.49 15.88 938.50 10.88 643.00
Total 37.29 2203.83 23.94 1414.84 15.5 916.04
The number of critical operations in various phases of the authentication framework is tabulated in Table 6. Energy
is calculated by using E = V ∗ I ∗ T (joules) is used, where V and I stand for voltage and current drawn respectively
and T is the execution time for each operation. The calculations have been done targeting MicaZ node powered
by 02AA batteries with 3Volts and 19.7mA load current. The energy and time calculations are shown in Table 7.
4. Conclusions
Based on the concept of ECC and ECDSA, a mutual authentication protocol comprising of 3 phases has been
designed and proposed.An experimental setup was created to compute the time taken by various signiﬁcant operations.
Time and energy analysis of the proposed protocol was carried on Micaz motes. As key Size plays an important role
in the level of security, time and energy analysis was carried out on 192, 160 and 128-bit curves. The protocol ﬁnds its
feasibility in smart city applications where low power sensor nodes are used.
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